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I. Introduction
deficits.
Economistshave long been concernedabout the best way to financegovernment
When
mix
is
a
crucial
decision.
and
fiscal
the
governmonetarypolicy
policy
Finding proper
mentdebtgrowstoo fast,interestratesriseand capitalis crowdedout. Ifthemoneygrowth
occurs.
rateis excessive,inflation
The studyof thisissue at thetheoreticallevelrequiresa modelwhichincorporatesthe
followingfeatures:(1) modelingmoneyand bonds as endogenousfinancialassets,whose
ratesof returnare determinedin generalequilibrium,(2) examinationof the utilitymaximizationdecisionsof individuals,so that welfareanalysisof alternativepolicies may be
and
made, (3) modelingthegovernment's
optimizationproblemand its budgetconstraint,
affect
investto
financial
assets
the
returns
how
investment,
showing
(4) modelingcapital
mentdecisions. In such a model, the government's
financingdecisionsaffectthe ratesof
returnon moneyand bonds,whichaffectthewelfareof individuals.Standardmodelsin the
economicliteraturedo not satisfyall thesefeatures.The purposeof thispaper is to derive
such a model.
Macroeconomicmodels oftenassume thatit is optimalto maximizeconsumptionor
output of the economy.This paper shows clearlythat such an assumptionis false in a
policywhichdrivestheinterest
dynamiccontext.Outputcan be maximizedbygovernment
rateto a low level. But theinterestrateaffectsintertemporal
consumptionpossibilities,and
a low interestratemayreducewelfare.
The goal of this paper is thus to examine the optimal growthrates of moneyand
debt,consideringtheirimplicationsforwelfare.Changes in theratesof return
government
on moneyand debt affectwelfarein threeways: (1) theyaffectthecapital stockand thus
output,(2) theyaffectconsumptiondirectlybecause people take out consumptionloans,
and (3) theyaffectthequantityof resourcesdevotedto transactionscosts.
We developa model of the financial-asset
holdingdecision.Moneyand bonds are the
two financialassets. Bonds are an explicitcontractbetweentwo agentsin theeconomy,a
contractwhichis costlyto write.Moneyis issuedbythegovernment
byfiat,and represents
return.
of
a
zero
nominal
rate
with
contract
a costless,implicit
*The authorwishesto thankEdwardJ. Kane forveryusefuladvice on an earlierdraft,as wellas J. Huston
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Capital in themodelis nota storeof value, merelya nondurablefactorof production.'
Individualsdifferin capital productivity.2
When people are young,theyborrowto buy
in middleage.
capital,whichincreasestheirproductivity
In sectionII, we describetheindividual'smaximizationproblem.Individualsfacetwo
majordecisions-how muchcapital to purchaseand whetherto hold moneyor bondsas a
storeof value. These decisionsdepend upon the interestrate,the inflationrate,and the
of capital. The ratesof returnon moneyand bonds are determinedendogenproductivity
ously,dependingupon individuals'decisions.Section III describestheaggregateequilibria.
In sectionIV we comparegovernment
in themarketto laissez-faire,
intervention
and sugA
how
increase
social
welfare.
numerical
illustrates
the
example
gest
governmentmay
results.The resultsare interpreted
in
and relatedto theexistingmacroeconomicliterature
sectionV.

II. The Individual'sMaximizationProblem
Capital goods and consumptiongoods are assumedto be physicallyidentical,merelyputto
uses. Capital goods are completelyused up in productionin one period.The prodifferent
ductionfunctionis F(k), wherek is theamountofcapitalwhicha personuses. It is assumed
thatF(0) = a > 0, F'(0)
0, F"(k) < 0 forall k, and limk-, F'(k)
O0.
live
three
People
periods.Theyborrowwhenyoungto buycapitalgoods and consumptiongoods. In middleage theyproduceoutputusingtheircapitalgoods and labor.Theyuse
eithermoneyor bondsas a storeof value to financeold-ageconsumption.When bondsare
used as a storeof value, transactionscosts in the fixedreal amounty are incurred.3This
whichmaybe interpreted
theexpenseofexplicitlywritinga debtagreement,
cost represents
as includingexpenses such as transportation
and time costs of travelto a bank, costs of
searchcosts,and thelike.
credit-worthiness,
investigating
The maximizationproblemfacingtheindividualis:
max.

','. cm o, k,s, b,l

c, co, k,s,b,I
subjectto: c.,g

-

U = In c,,+ 6 In cm+6

2

In c

0,

= c, + k,
b/p.,=
(1 +
F(k)
b/p,?+ Cm+ S/pm + l/pm+ y ifs > 0, or
iy,)
F(k) = (1 + i,) b/p, + c,, + l/pm ifs = 0,

(1)
(2a)
(2b)

[1/(1 +?rm)]l/pm + (1 + im)s/pm= co,

(3)

whileyoung,middle-aged,
whereIn is thenaturallogarithm,
Cm,and co are consumption
cy,,
and old, k is the size of the capital stock;s and I are the nominalamountsof bonds and
moneyheld as storesof value, b is thenominalamountof borrowing,
p,,p,,, and are the
po

durablecapitalintothemodel,butit contributes
littleand addsadditional
i. It wouldbe simpleto incorporate
termsto already-complicated
equations.
2. This setupcouldwelldescribehumancapital.
3. The transactions-cost
setupis identicalto thatof Baumol[2] and manyotherswhofollowed.
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pricelevelsfacingtheindividualin successiveperiods.The grossrealreturnon bondsis 1 +
is the
i, (t=y, m) whilethe grossreal returnon moneyholdingsis 1/(1 + 'rm),where7r,,,
=
is
a
time
index.
where
t
In
of
inflation.
rate
Equations (1), (2),
/p,,
general,1 + r,
p,++
and (3) are simplythebudgetequations
facingtheindividualin each period.
Equation (1) showsthata youngpersonborrowsamountb to spend on consumption
goods (c,,) and capital goods (k). A middle-agedpersonchooses how muchmoney(1) and
bonds (s) to hold as a storeof value forold age, incurringthe transactionscosts y in
equation (2a) ifbonds are held. Equation (2) showsthatreal income(output)is F(k), and
thatthe principaland intereston borrowingwhen youngare repaid. The real returnsto
moneyholdingsand bond holdingsare used to financeconsumptionin old age, as shownin
equation(3).
The shape of the utilityfunctionrequiresthatwe get c, > 0, c,, > 0, and c, > 0, if
negative.Usingbudgetequations(1) and (3), nonnegautilityis not to be driveninfinitely
0
and eithers > 0 or I > 0. Because of thenonconvexity
of
b
>
tivity consumptionrequires
of transactionscosts,thechoice betweenholdingbondsand moneymustbe made by comparingutilitylevelsundereach. No marginaldecisionrulecan be obtained.Because of the
natureof the(nonconvex)budgetconstraint,moneyand bondsare neverused bythesame
person.Ifthemarginalconditionson moneyand bondsare thesame,moneyis used because
bonds have a positivefixed-costcomponent.First,we examinethe case wherebonds are
used.
UtilityMaximization UsingBonds
When an individualuses bonds, equation (2a) is used in settingup the Lagrangian.The
Kuhn-Tuckerconditionon k yields:
(4)
F'(k) ? 1 +
i+,,
withequalityif k > 0. Thus ifcapital is used, we get the normalresultthatthe marginal
productof capitalequals therateof interest.It is easyto showthata personwillchoose k =
0 onlyifF'(0) 5 1 + i,,.If F'(0) 5 1 + i,, thensince F"(k) < 0, we musthave F'(k) < 1 +
i,,forall k > 0. When F'(0) > 1 + i,,,theoptimalvalue of k is finitesincelim F'(k) 5 0
k-and 1 + i, > 0.4
Figure 1 illustratestheoptimalchoice of capital. This diagramshowstwo production
functions,Fa and Fb. The marginalproductof capital at k= 0 is greaterthan the real
so theoptimalcapital stockis positive,and
+
marginalcost of borrowing(F'a (0) > 1 i+,),
occursat levelk*, fortheproductionfunctionFa. For productionfunctionFb,themarginal
productof capital is alwaysless thanthereal marginalcost of borrowing(F'b (0) < 1 + iv),
so it is not optimalto purchasecapital.
termsbycombiningequations
A lifetime-budget
constraintis derivedin present-value
(1), (2a), and (3), eliminatingb and s. We definethisin termsofthepresentvalue at middle
age:
F(k)-

(1 +

i,,)k

-

y=

(1 + i,)c, + cm +

[1/(1

+

im)]Co.

(5)

The left-handside of (5) is thepresentvalue at middleage of incomeminusnonconsump4. I + i.,,mustbe positiveto haveanyeconomicmeaning.
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F(k)
slope= I+iy
a+ (l+iy)k
(a)

aF (k)

a

Fb(k)
k*

k

F'(k)

(b)

I+iy

0

k

F(k)
FigureI

The optimal
tionexpenditures,
whiletheright-hand
side showsconsumptionexpenditures.
choice of k maximizestheleft-handside of (5). As long as F'(k) > 1 + i,, an increasein k
causes F(k) to riserelativeto (1 + i,,)k.
Figure2 illustratesthe returnsto capital. k* is theoptimallevel of capital. Gross returnsto capitalare F(k*) - a, in unitsoftheconsumptiongood at middleage. The interest
cost of capitalis A - a = (1 +
Net returnsto capitalare F(k*) - A = F(k*) - a i,,)k*.
+
(1 i,)k*.
We now considertheproductionfunctiongivenby:
F(k) = a + qk - (,f/2)k2,

(6)

wherea > 0, q > 0, 8 > 0.
This functionhas thedesiredproperties:(a) F(0) = a > 0; (b) F'(0)
0; (c) F"(k) =
4
-=
of
is:
The
<
=
- kk O0.
0; (d) limk-, F'(k)
marginalproduct capital
-3
F'(k) = 4 - 8k.

(7)
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F(k)

slope= I+iy
F(k)

-

a + (!+iy)k

F(k*) ------

net
returns

-A= a + (l+i)k
interest
expense

a

k

k*
Figure2

Since F'(0) = f,thenk > 0 ifand onlyif #> 1 i+,.
Using(7) in (4), theoptimalcapital
+
is
purchase
k = [ - (1 +

for

1 + i,.
(8)
ii.,)]/ stockfallsas theinterestraterises.Giventhis
As expected, k/18(1+ i,) < 0, so thecapital
capital purchase,outputis:
+ (1/2,3)[2 --(1 ? i,)2].
The netreturnto capital,as shownin Figure2, is givenby:
F(k) a=

(9)

=
[qi - (1 + i,,)]2.
i.,)k (1/2/3)
We now summarizethesolutionto theindividual'schoiceproblem:
F(k) - a - (1 +

a. When 0 > 1 + i,,,thenk > 0, and:
c, = [1/(1 + 6 + 62)][1/(1 + i,,)] {a + (1/2f)[

- (1 + i)]2

b/p, = [1/(1 + 6 + 62)] [1/(1 + i,)] (c + (1/2)2
-y)
(1/238)(1+ i,.) + (6 + 62)(1//P)[q (1 + iy)]},

-

(10)

(11)
(12)
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=
+ (1/220)[#i- (1 + i,,)]2- y.
s/p,, [62/(1 + 6 + 62)] {a
b. When r 1 + i,,,thenk = 0 and F(k) = a, so:
c, = b/p, = [1/(1 + 6 + 62)](1/(1 + i,)] (a - y),
s/pm = [62/(1 + 6 + 62)] (a - y).

(13)

(14)
(15)

In bothcases (when k > 0 and whenk = 0) consumptionin middleage and old age is:
cm

6(1 +

i,,)c.,,
= 6(1 + im)Cm.
Co

(16)

(17)

UtilityMaximization UsingMoney
When moneyis used as a storeof value,equation(2b) is used in settingup theLagrangian.
Conditionsforoptimal k are unaffectedby the choice betweenmoneyand bonds. The
solutionto theindividual'schoiceproblemis now modified:
a. Whent > 1 +

thenk > 0, and:
i.,,
c, = [1/(1 + 6 + 6 2)][1/(1 + i,,)] {a + (1/23) [# - (1 + i,)]21,
=
b/p, [1/(1 + 6 + 62)] {[1/(1 + i,)] [a + (1/283)t2]
- (1 + i,)]},
- (1/
23)(1 + iY) + (6 + 6 2)(1/3 ) [0
i/pm= [62/( + 6 + 6 2)] {a + (1/2f3)[#- (1 +
i,,)]21.
b. Whentf 1 + i,,,thenk = 0 and F(k) = a, so:
?= [1/(1 + 6 + 62)][1/(1 + i,,)] a,
c, =
b/p,i/pm= [62/( + 6 + 62)] a.

(18)

(19)
(20)

(21)
(22)

In bothcases, consumptionin middleage and old age is:
Cm= 6(1 + ij,)cj,,

(23)

Co = 6[1/(1 + 7rm)]Cm.

(24)

The effect
on thelifetimeconsumptionstreamof thechoicebetweenmoneyand bonds
can be seen bycomparingequations(11) to (18), (16) to (23), and (17) to (24). Consumption
whileyoungand middle-agedis lowerwhen bonds are used as a storeof value, due to the
added term-y in equation (11) whichdoes not appear in (18). However,thisis offsetby
higherconsumptionin old age, whenthereturnto bonds (1 + im) in equation(17) exceeds
in equation (24). The same effectcan be seen when
the returnto money[1/(1 +
rm)]
used
bycomparingequation(14) to equation(21).
capitalisn't
The impactof theuse of capital can be seen by comparingequations(11) to (14) and
thelifetimeis clearlyhigherwhencapitalis used.
(18) to (21). Consumptionthroughout
theindividual'schoiceproblemin thiseconomy.Our
We havecompletelycharacterized
nextstep is to examinethemacroeconomy.
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III. AggregateEquilibrium
We now partitionindividualsintofourclasses, based on theirchoicesof capital purchases
and whethertheyuse bondsor moneyas a storeof value. These classesare denoted:
I.

Capital is purchasedand bonds are used

II.

Capital is purchasedand moneyis used

Ill. Capital is not purchasedand bondsare used
IV. Capital is not purchasedand moneyis used

(k > 0, s > 0,1 = 0),
(k > 0, s = 0, I > 0),
(k =0, s > 0, I = 0),
(k = 0, s = 0, > 0).

ofthepopulationin each class
The aggregateequilibriumdependsupon theproportion
(I. k > 0, s > 0; 11.k > 0, s = 0; III. k = 0, s > 0; IV. k = 0, s = 0). The equilibrium
and inflation-rate
interest-rate
sequences both affectand are affectedby the numberof
in
each
class.
Consequently,theequilibriumvalues of theendogenousvariablesare
people
to find.
difficult
To keep thingsfairlysimple,we assume thatthereare two typesof people, richand
by theterm41in theproductionfunction(6).5 This termis the
poor,who are distinguished
of
marginalproductivity capitalat k = 0. The well-endowedrichhave #,and thepoor have
4p,

where tr >

i/p.

Threepatternsof thebond-moneychoice are possible: (1) theall-bondequilibriumin
whichboth richand poor use bonds; (2) themixed-bondequilibriumin whichtherichuse
bonds and the poor use money;and (3) theall-moneyequilibriumin whicheveryoneuses
moneyas a storeof value.6Similarly,threepossibilitiesforcapital exist: (1) an all-capital
equilibriumin whicheveryoneuses some capital; (2) a mixed-capitalequilibriumin which
therichuse capital whilethepoor do not; and (3) a no-capitalequilibrium.Thus thereare
nine possible equilibria,dependingon the bond-moneychoice and the capital choice. By
role
changingtheparametersof themodel(a, #,,#p,y) and dependingon thegovernment's
in theeconomy(to be describedlater),anyone of thenineequilibriacan be reached,except
forthemixed-bond,no-capitalequilibrium.7
We denote the populationof each generationborn at time t of the richand poor as
N, (t) and NP(t). We assumethatbothgroupsgrowat raten, so thatwe havean overlappinggenerationsmodelwitha growingpopulation.
Nr(t) = (1 + n)Nr(t - 1),

Np(t)

= (1 +
n)N, (t - 1).

(25)

5. Sargentand Wallace[7] examinea similarrich-poor
endowments
setup.Thisallowspeoplewhohavediffering
to demanddifferent
assets.
typesoffinancial
6. The solutionsto theindividual's
maximization
ofa reverse-mixed
problemprecludethepossibility
equilibrium
in whichtherichholdmoneywhilethepoorholdbonds.
7. The mixed-bond,
can'tbe reachedbecauseifneitherrichnorpoor use capital,both
no-capitalequilibrium
are
typesofpeopleproducethesameoutput,so bothgroupsuse thesamestoreofvalue.Weassumethattheparameters
in whichsomegroupisjustindifferent
suchthatwe neverreachan "indifference
to holdingeitherbondsor
equilibrium"
ofthegroupholdseachasset.
money,so thatsomefraction
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We assumethatthegovernment's
roleis to maximizethesocial welfareofeach generationwhiletreatingeach memberof each type(rich,poor) equallyacrossgenerations.Thus
thegovernment
seeks a stationarysolutionwith Ur(t) = Ur and UP(t) = UP forall t. We
thatgovernment
assumefurther
so thatsocial-welfare
policyis distribution-neutral,
weights
are assignedproportionalto theoutputa personproduces.Thus social welfareat timet is a
monotonictransformation
of thestationaryfunction:
W=

Ur' + (1 - 0) (Np/Nr) UP,

(26)

where 4 = Fr (k*)/l[Fr (k*) + FP (k*)], and NP/Nr = NP,(t)/Nr (t) for all t, fromequation

in themodelat
(25). The termk* is thelevelof capitalchosenin theabsence ofall frictions
a Pareto-optimalequilibrium.8
The government
maximizessocial welfaresubjectto its budgetconstraint,
givenby:
G(t) + [1 + R(t-1)] Sg(t-1) + D!(t) =
Sg(t) + [1 + R(t-1)]Dg(t-1)

+ X(t) + M(t) - AM(t-1),

(27)

where1 + R(t-1-) = [1 + i(t--1)][1 + rr(t-1-l)].Government
spending(G(t)) plus interest
and principalpaymentson bonds sold last period (S (t-1)) plus new lending(D9(t)) is
equal to total governmentoutflowsof funds.Inflowsof fundscome fromsellingbonds
col(S~(t)), collectinginterestand principalpaymentson outstandingloans (D(t-l)),
we assume
M(t-1)). For simplicity,
lectingtaxes (X(t)), and printingnew money(M(t)
thatno taxesare collectedand thatthesole government
spendingitemis transactionscosts
can borrowor lend,
on bond purchasesand sales (describedbelow). Since thegovernment
in thegovernment
we
thevariableDg
define
and theseare symmetric
budgetconstraint,
incurstransactions
We now suppose thatthegovernment
costs wheneverit exchanges
bondsand moneyin themarket.The transactionscostsare a marginalcostof 0(1D/ (t)l +
IS (t)I), where0 ?> 0. Underthiscost setup,the governmenteitherborrowsor lends,not
of themodeldescribedabove, it is alwaysoptimalforthegovernboth. Withthestructure
mentto set Dg(t) > 0. Thus G(t) = 0Dg(t).
A stationarysolutionin themoneyand bond marketsis one forwhich1 + i, = 1 + i
and 1 + nr,= 1 + -rforall t. These solutionscan onlybe reachedin thismodelwhenreal
governmentdebt and monetizationeach growat the rate of populationgrowth,so that
Dg (t)/N(t)p(t) = D/ Nrp and M(t)/ Nr(t)p(t) = M/Nrp forall t. Usingtheseexpresas:
sions,equation(27) can be rewritten
(28)
[( +0)( +n) - (1 + i)] D/ Nrp [(1 + n) - (1/(1 + r7))] M/Nrp.
The aggregatevariablesare as follows:
a. Aggregateuse of goods in transactions:
(29)
L(t) = ZNr(t--l)yp(t) + ZbPNp(t-1)yp(t) + ODg(t),
0
whereZbr(ZbP) equals 1 if the rich(poor) use bonds and equals if theyuse moneyas a
storeof value.
withtheweightschosen.We examinehereonlyone
8. Of course,theresultsof thispapervaryquantitatively
The weight4 could be adjustedeasilyto examinethe
possiblesetof weights-thatset whichis "distribution-neutral."
is beyondthescopeof thispaper.
of redistributional
efforts.
Suchan investigation
implications
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b. Aggregatedemandforbonds:
Db (t) = ZbrNr (t--l)sr (t) + ZbP N (t-1)sp (t) + D9 (t).

(30)

c. Aggregatesupplyof bonds:
Sb (t) = Nr,(t)b'r(t)

+

(31)

Np (t) bp (t).

d. Aggregatedemandformoney:

+ (1 ZbP)Np(t-1l)1P(t).

Dm(t) = (1 - Zbr)Nr(t--l)lr(t)
e. Aggregatesupplyof money:
Sm (t)

= Dm (t--l1)+ [M(t)-

(32)

(33)

M(t--l)].

The real interestrate whichclears the bond marketcan be foundby settingDb (t) =
The
Sb (t), substituting
equationsto eliminateall choicevariables,and solvingalgebraically.
resultis thefollowingcubic expression:
{[1/(1 + n)] 62(1/20)
+ {(1/03)(1/2 + 6 +

[Zbr Zkr + Zb Zk~ (Np
62)[Zkr

Nr)]}(1

+ i)3

+ Zk, Np/Nr] - [1/(1 + n)] 62(1/3)[Zkr

Zbr

r

+ Zk" Zb (p Nr)ip]}(l + i)2 + {[1/(1 + n)162[(Z + ZbPNp Nr)(a - y)
+ (1/20)(Z; Zr 2i + Zkp Z'p (Np!Nr)I2)] + (1 + 6 + 62)(1 - Z r Zb )Dg/NrP
- (6 + 62)(l/Ip)(Zkr[r + Z P (Np Nr)4Ip)}(1 + i) + {y[Zbr + ZbPNp/ Nr
- (1 + N,/N,)a

- (1/220)[Zk
+ ZP (Np/ Nr)~I]} = 0,
r2r

(34)

whereZk (Z P) equals 1 iftherich(poor) havea positivecapitalstock,and equals 0 iftheir
capital stockis zero. Equation (34) is not reallyas complexas it firstappears. The Z terms
allow us to pack all eightpossibleequilibriaintoone expression.For some equilibria,this
considerably.
equationsimplifies
The real returnto moneywhichclearsthemoneymarketis givenby:
1/(1 + r) = (1 + n){l - [[(1 + 0)(1 + n) - (1 + i)]/DENOM] D/NNrp},
DENOM =
+ 6 + 6)2] {a[(l - Zr) + (1 - Z P)Np/
Nr
[62/(I
+ (1/ 20)[Zkr (1 - Zbr)(r - (1 + i))2
+ ZkP(1 - ZbP)(lp - (1 + i))2]}.

(35)

(36)

Again, thisexpressionrepresentsthegeneralcase forall eightpossibleequilibria,but simifno group
rateis undefined
plifiesconsiderablyforanyparticularequilibrium.The inflation
uses moneyas a storeof value.
IV. The Government'sOptimizationProblem
In thissectionwe compareoptimalgovernment
intervention
in thebond marketto laissezdoes not intervenein
faire.9First,we examinethelaissez-fairecase whenthegovernment
we meana case in whichthegovernment
9. By"intervention"
exchangesbondsformoneyor moneyforbondsin
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ValuesofVariables
TableI. Equilibrium
a

6

-

b
0

c

d

.05

.1

Equilibrium (Z,,Zg,Z,,Z k)
Df/ Nrp
1+i
1/(1+ r)
L/ Nr

1,0,1,0
0
2.42
1.50
.333

0,0,1,1
7.87
1.50
1.50
0

0,0,1,1
7.52
1.57
1.50
.376

1,0,1,1
2.06
1.62
1.27
.540

k'
F'r

/P/p

.952
27.9
7.51
0
5.60
0
3
0
.897

.970
28.0
0
7.93
5.84
.0100
3.02
0
.897

.969
28.0
0
7.91
5.78
.00850
3.02
0
.897

.968
28.0
7.74
0
5.76
.00767
3.01
0
.897

Y = Fr + (Np/Nr) FP

29.441

29.486

29.483

29.481

W

s'r/p

lp
U'r
kP
Fp
sP/p

Up

5.03

-.547

5.27

-.0648

5.21

-.114

5.19

-.275

the bond market.Next,we show thatwelfarecan be improvedby government
bond purfaces no transactionscosts.'0
chases whichreducethe interestrate,when the government
rise,thewelfaregains frominterHowever,as thetransactionscostsfacingthegovernment
ventionfall. Finally,we comparetheabove resultsto a situationin whichthegovernment
intervenesin themarketnotto maximizesocial welfare,butto maximizethetotaloutputof
theeconomy.
EquilibriumWhenGovernmentDoes Not Intervenein theBond Market
does not intervenein the bond market,the nominalmoneysupplyreIf the government
mainsconstant,and thereoccursa deflationat therateof populationgrowth:
1/(1 + r)= 1 + n.

(37)

The real interestrateis determinedbyequation(34) withD'/ Nrp = 0. Because of the
complicationsof examiningall eightpossibleequilibriaanalytically,we insteadlook at a
numericalexample to illustratethe resultsof the model. We let the parameterstake the
followingvalues: 6 = .9, 'y = .5, n = .5, Np/Nr = .5, a = 3,/3
P = 50, r,-= 50, q, = 2.
Given these parameters,the laissez-faireequilibriumis shownin Table 1, columna.
The economyis in a mixed-bond,mixed-capitalequilibrium,the rich using bonds and
holdinga positivecapitalstock,thepoor usingmoneyas a storeof value and notusingany
capital.
in themarket,thenit
does not intervene
the market.This is termed"active"government
policy.If thegovernment
neither
changesthemoneysupplynorexchangesanymoneyforbonds.
of steadystates.Theyare
10. It shouldbe notedthatthewelfarecomparisons
beingmadehereare comparisons
statewelfareis
notvalidforevaluatinga changein policyfroman existingpolicytoa newone,becausethenon-steady
ofin thefollowing
in thepapermaybe thought
sense:givena knowneconomic
notanalyzed.The welfarecomparisons
oftime?
whatis theoptimalgovernment
structure,
policywhichshouldbe followedfromthebeginning
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In thisequilibrium,the real interestrate is over 100%. The demand forborrowingis
veryhigh,since people wishto borrowbothforconsumptionand forcapital formation.A
highreal interestrateis necessaryto equate thedemandand supplyforbonds.
The richfindit profitableto utilizemuchmorecapital thanthe poor. A considerable
in outputis apparent,withthe richproducing27.9 unitsand thepoor producing
difference
3
only units.
We now showthatgovernmentintervention
maybe optimalby changingthe interest
rateto maximizesocial welfare.
rateand inflation
EquilibriumWhenGovernmentIntervenesto Maximize Social Welfare
triesto maximizesocial welfare,it mustsatisfyitsbudgetconstraint
When thegovernment
theoptimal
and achievea stationary
equilibriumwhichis stable.This can be done byfinding
moneysupplyand governmentbond level foreach of the eightpossible equilibria.The
equilibriumwiththehighestsocial-welfarevalue is thenchosen. Finally,thestabilityof the
equilibriummustbe verified.
is forthegovernment
In thenumericalexample,theoptimalgovernment
intervention
to lend enough that it eliminatesthe use of bonds as a storeof value, when thereexist
no transactionscosts (0 = 0). The all-money,all-capitalequilibriumcan be reachedwith
NrP = 7.87, as shownin Table I, columnb.
Db/ A
occurs relativeto the situationin whichthegovernment
does
Pareto-improvement
not intervene(comparecolumnsa and b of Table 1). Boththe richand the poor are made
betteroff.The real interestratefalls,to equal theeconomy's(population)growthrate,with
no change in the inflationrate." Output is increasedbecause both richand poor people
purchasemorecapital than before.Consumptionincreasesbecause of higheroutputand
because of a reductionin resourcesused up in transactions(L/ Nr).
The resultsare due primarily
to an intergenerational
freelunch.Government
intervention providesfundsto the bond market,loweringthe interestrate significantly.
Everyone
is made betteroffdue to the perpetualnatureof the government
loan, whichneed never
be repaid. In a sense,thisis a reversePonzi scheme,wherethegovernment
keepslending
more(in real terms)as thepopulationgrows.The Paretoimprovement
occursbecause the
allows tradingbetweengenerations,as in manymodelsof overlapping
schemeeffectively
generations.
withTransactionsCosts
EquilibriumunderOptimal GovernmentIntervention
Whenthegovernment
incurstransactionscosts,thescope of itsoptimalintervention
in the
bond and moneymarketsis reduced. Because the0 termin thegovernment's
budgetconstraintbecomespositive,resourcesmustbe obtainedbythegovernment
to pay thesetransactionscosts.
In the numericalexample,with0 = .05, the all-money,all-capitalequilibriumis still
sustainable,butnow Db/Nrp is reducedto 7.52. The resultsare shownin Table 1,columnc.
on optimalgrowth
withmoney-a golden"financial
asset"rule
11. Thisresultis identicalto thoseintheliterature
is followedas in Tobin[8], Friedman[5] and Bewley[3]. The inflation
ratedoes notchangein thiscase, becausewhile
themoneystockhas risen,so has moneydemand.Richpeopleswitchfromholdingbondsas a storeofvalueto holding
money.
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Compared withthecase of no transactionscosts (columnb), thisequilibriumhas a higher
interestrate,henceless capitaland less output.Everyoneis worseoff.
Notice thatin comparisonwiththe laissez-faireequilibrium(column a), everyoneis
betteroff.Outputis higherbecausethereducedrealinterestratehas led to increasedcapital
use. But transactionscosts eat up a lot of output. In fact,transactionscosts (L/ Nr) are
higherherethanin thelaissez-faireequilibrium,so thataggregateconsumptionis reduced.
of consumpThe reductionin consumptionis overcomebythebetterintertemporal
tradeoff
occurs.
tionpossibilities,
and a Paretoimprovement
becomesless valuAs thetransactionscostsfacedbythegovernment
rise,intervention
able. As thesecosts rise,optimalgovernmentpolicymovescloserto laissez-faire,and the
freelunchdecline.
benefitsfromtheintergenerational
This is illustratedin columnd of Table I, where0 = .1 (i.e., 10% of thefundsgovernmentlends mustgo to transactionscosts). The equilibriumbecomesone in whichtherich
switchto usingbondsas a storeof value, so thatwe havea mixed-bond,all-capitalequilibis reducedsubstantially
to DI/ Nrp = 2.06. This
rium.Optimal governmentintervention
causes thereal interestrateto risewhilethereal returnto moneyfalls.
Maximizationof Output
Governments
sometimesfollowa policyof maximizingtheirnation'sgrossnationalproduct
or
some othermeasureof economicoutput.An increasein outputis obtainablein
(GNP)
thismodel,butonlyat thecost of decreasedsocial welfare.
costson government
For example,whenthereare no transactions
intervention,
output
b
of
in
theall-money,allas
in
column
Table
to
29.493
be
increased
from
can
29.486,
(Y)
I,
lendingfrom7.87 to
capitalequilibrium.This is accomplishedbyan increasein government
8.69, causingthereal interestrateto fallfrom.50 to .35. Capital usage is increasedbyboth
richand poor.
The amountof goods available forconsumptionincreasesmorethanthetransactions
costs of generatingadditionaloutput.Despite the increasein consumption,social welfare
falls.The changesin the real interestrateand theinflationratechangepeople's intertemmakingthemworseoff.
poralconsumptionpossibilities,
The implicationof thisresultis clear-the governmentshould not drivethe interest
nationalproduct,and consumption.
rateas low as possiblein orderto increaseinvestment,
It musttradeoffthe gains fromadditionaloutputwiththe loss in termsof intertemporal
available in consumption.
tradeoffs

and Conclusions
V. Interpretation
thatthegovernment's
The major resultof thispaper is to demonstratetheoretically
entry
into capital marketsaffectssocial welfarein threeways: (1) by changingthe amountof
theequilibriuminterestrateand inflaresourcesused up in transactions;(2) by modifying
tion rate,transforming
consumptionpaths (potentially,as in this
people's intertemporal
theutilizationof capitalin the
and (3) byaffecting
paper,yieldinga Pareto-improvement);
economy,thusaffecting
output. Further,we see thatit is not optimalto maximizetotal
output.
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These resultsare obtainedin a fairlysimplemodelin whichthereis neithergovernment
spendingon goods and servicesnortaxation.The optimafoundin thepaper are generally
second-best,giventhe existenceof transactionscosts. If lump-sumtaxationand transfers
are available to thegovernment,
first-best
optima are obtainable.Also, the resultthatit is
for
to
lend
rather
thanborrowfrom,theprivatesector,could be
the
to,
government
optimal
reversedifthegovernmenthas some spendingto finance.Thus theresultsofthispaper are
only suggestiveof some of the importantconsiderationsin a morecompletemodel which
incorporatesgovernment
spendingand taxation.Such a modelis a logicalextensionof the
model of this paper. It seems likelyto yieldthe resultthatgovernmentspendingcan be
and partlybyprintingmoney,withthe
financedpartiallybytaxation,partlyby borrowing,
of
finance
determined
relativesharesof each method
being
by (1) transactionscosts, (2)
and (3) theoptimalcapital stock.
intertemporal
consumptiontradeoffs,
It is importantto realizethatin thismodel,the governmentdoes farmorethanjust
reducingaggregatetransactionscosts. In fact,as the numericalexamplesillustrate,it may
be optimalforgovernmentintervention
to cause resourcesspenton transactionscosts to
increase.This resultis in contrastto thatof Bryantand Wallace[4] in whichbondfinanceis
inefficient
relativeto moneyfinancebecause it raises transactionscosts. Similarly,some
economistsarguethatgovernment
debtshouldbe increasedwheneverpeople faceliquidity
constraints(includingcases as in thispaper, wherethe ratesof returnon borrowingand
due to transactionscosts). The resultsof this paper show that while this
lendingdiffer,
shouldbe done,thereis a limitto theamountofgovernment
intervention
whichis optimal.
The focus of this paper is strictlylong run. An interestingextensionwould be to
incorporatea businesscycleintothemodel,examinetheroleof liquidityconstraintsin such
a model,and see how optimalgovernment
policywould varyoverthecycle.Also, forboth
and
short-run
be
to examinetheroleof technological
it
long-run
analyses, may interesting
in
the
function
over
and
time)
change(changes
production
changein thetransactionstechin
nology-y(forexample,due to computerization thefinancial-services
industry).
The resultsof thispaper are relevantto theempiricaltestingof theeffectsof governmentdebtand monetizationon interestrates.The costs of tradingdebtformoneyand the
costs of servicingdebt are likelyto be important.This suggeststhatdifferent
typesof debt
to
be
treated
forexample Treasurydebt versusthe debt of the Socialought
differently,
Securitysystem.
Finally,the Ricardian Equivalence Theoremdoes not hold in this model. We are
examininga non-Ricardianregime,one in whichthereare no futuretax liabilitiesimplied
debt.12Consequently,changesin government
debt
by theexistenceof currentgovernment
affectinterestrates.
12.The importance
of thedistinction
betweenRicardianand non-Ricardian
regimeshas beenmade bySargent
[6] and Aiyagariand Gertler[I].
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